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SLICING SPONTANEITY
Lee Anne Fennell*
Spontaneous order, as famously explored by Friedrich Hayek, is the
antithesis of top-down control; it emerges from a multiplicity of individual
responses to dispersed informational signals.1 Hayek’s work emphasizes the
role of market forces in providing those signals, and the role of law in
providing the background conditions under which a spontaneous marketbased order can arise and thrive.2 Private property fits cleanly into this
model. Yet there are many domains of great economic and social
significance in which private property rights have not (or have not yet) been
established; rather, resources are held in common. Examples range from
shared roads and parks, to fisheries and forests, to the ambience or bustle in
a neighborhood or business district. Establishing and sustaining
spontaneous order in these contexts means finding ways for individuals to
coordinate their dispersed actions in the absence of formal private property
rights or top-down coercion.3
*
Max Pam Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. For helpful comments and questions, I am
grateful to Lee Alston, Richard Brooks, Ryan Bubb, Yun-chien Chang, Richard Epstein, William Kaplan, Dean
Lueck, and participants in the Spontaneous Order and Emergence of New Systems of Property conference held at
NYU Law School. For financial support, I thank the Stuart C. and JoAnn Nathan and Harold J. Green Faculty
Funds and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation.
1
See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 140-41 (1960) [hereinafter HAYEK,
CONSTITUTION] (discussing spontaneous order and citing MICHAEL POLANYI, THE LOGIC OF LIBERTY:
REFLECTIONS AND REJOINDERS 159 (1951)); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY, VOL. 1:
RULES AND ORDER 35-54 (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, RULES] (examining manifestations of spontaneous order in
natural and social systems); see also F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519
(1945) [hereinafter Hayek, Knowledge] (emphasizing the importance of harnessing dispersed knowledge).
2
See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY, VOL. 3: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A
FREE PEOPLE 162 (1973) (“[T]his extensive social division of labour [in modern society], based on widely
dispersed information, has been made possible entirely by the use of those impersonal signals which emerge from
the market process and tell people what to do in order to adapt their activities to events of which they have no
direct knowledge.”); Hayek, Knowledge, supra note 1, at 526-28 (describing the coordinating and informationtransmission function of prices). In Hayek’s view, “the task of the lawgiver is not to set up a particular order but
merely to create conditions in which an orderly arrangement can establish and ever renew itself.” HAYEK,
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 141; see also HAYEK, RULES, supra note 1, at 47 (analogizing one function of
government to the maintenance of machinery that serves the purposes determined by the aggregate decisions of
producers and consumers).
3
Large literatures have examined the conditions that support such informal cooperation, including the line of
scholarship associated with Elinor Ostrom’s groundbreaking work on common-pool resources. See, e.g., ELINOR
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990). Other work has examined how social norms support informal order.
See, e.g., ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991). Urban infrastructure and information commons
have increasingly received attention. For a recent overview and discussion, see Yochai Benkler, Commons and
Growth: The Essential Role of Open Commons in Market Economies, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1499 (2013) (reviewing
BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES (2012)). A related line
of literature examines the emergence or evolution of property rights. See, e.g., ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS
OF RIGHTS, COOPERATION, AND WELFARE (2d ed. 2004); Lee Alston & Bernardo Mueller, Towards a More
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This paper focuses on the role of resource segmentation—the natural or
artificial division of resources into appropriable units—in eliciting and
maintaining coordination among resource users in the absence of formal
property rights. My claim is that the appropriate segmentation of resources
can reduce informal governance burdens and help to produce convergence
between privately optimal and socially optimal choices.4
To take a simple example, a pie that has been divided into singleserving slices is easy for a group to share in a strife-free manner. Even if
social norms might cut against taking “too much” of an undivided shared
resource (such as a milkshake accessed with multiple straws, or a natural
gas reserve lying under land held separately by a number of neighbors), it
can be difficult to know how much is too much in the absence of visible,
pre-divided shares. Self-serving bias takes on a rather literal meaning in
such settings,5 and excessive claims by multiple parties can generate losses
through overly rapid or contentious extraction.6 Segmentation is relevant
not only where resources are extracted from a common pool, but also where
effort or other resources must be contributed to a common project. Here too,
success may depend on how the solicited contributions are broken up into
standardized units.7
There are two basic reasons that resource segmentation matters to
spontaneous order: it can reduce informal governance burdens by
facilitating measurement, and it can produce convergence between privately
and socially valuable choices by constructing choice sets. Consider first
how resource segmentation supports governance. Segmentation, whether
given by nature (individual animals, trees, pieces of fruit) or artificially
constructed (boatloads, bushels, pie slices) provides a measuring rod for
assessing draws on, or contributions to, common pools. Measurement
enables monitoring by other participants that can facilitate the enforcement
of social norms.8 It also allows parties to monitor their own behavior and
compare it with that of others. This process of comparison can support
internalized norms of fairness and reassure actors that their own efforts or
acts of forbearance are being reciprocated by others.
Evolutionary Theory of Property Rights, IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming [this issue] 2015).
4
I do not mean to suggest that resource segmentation is only useful in the context of informal order; it is also
foundational to formal order to the extent it eases enforcement burdens. It can also feature in any number of
hybrid or evolving systems.
5
See, e.g., Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1337
(1995) (examining self-serving evaluations of fairness and their capacity to impede settlement).
6
See, e.g., Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights in the
United States, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S589, S591-92 (2002) (describing the costs of “extractive anarchy” in the oil
and gas context); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles To Governing the Commons, 30
ENVTL. L. 241, 250 (2000) (noting similar issues with groundwater extraction).
7
See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a
Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 336 (2004) (noting the significance of divisible, granular
segments of effort in sustaining models of peer production that rely on widespread volunteerism).
8
See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 3, at 45, 94-100 (discussing the significance of monitoring).
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Resource segmentation also helps produce convergence between
privately and socially optimal choices. This result follows from two
underappreciated concepts: irrelevant externalities and lumpiness.9 A
simple example illustrates the intuition. People who attend festivals create
positive spillovers for others in attendance.10 These positive spillovers
create no inefficiencies if the person is motivated to attend the festival for
her own reasons and would not do anything differently if she were able to
collect payments from those who benefit from her presence. This last
proviso—that she would not do anything differently—is more likely to be
fulfilled if “attending the festival” is a discrete, binary action that must be
performed in its entirety or not at all. When contributions or withdrawals
from a common pool take such “lumpy” or discontinuous forms, the private
and social optimum may more readily converge on a single choice, despite
the presence of externalities.11
Because resource segmentation influences the prospects for cooperative
behavior, it should be an explicit focus of law and policy. Law can, for
example, take a direct role as a resource slicer or aggregator. Society may
also help to edge chunky private decisions in the direction of social
optimality through investments in infrastructure and the like. These legal
and policy efforts can improve conditions for informal self-ordering around
resources. They can also help foster the emergence of formal property rights
or facilitate the use of market-mimicking regulation rather than commandand-control coercion. In short, segmentation can support spontaneous order.
The analysis here proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the
significance of resource segmentation for governance in the absence of
formal private property rights. Parts II shows how resource segmentation,
by constructing choice sets, influences efficiency. Part III connects these
two ideas and considers the implications for law and policy.
I. SEGMENTATION AND GOVERNANCE
The ways in which resources are sliced up, either naturally or by design,
influences the prospects for informal order and coordination in the absence
of formal entitlements. I start with an overview of the forms resource
segmentation can take and then explain how governance costs might be
affected by segmentation—for better or worse.

9

See infra Part II.A.
See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 769 (1986) (describing a festival as “exponentially enhanced by greater
participation”).
11
See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
10

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2562193

4

Fennell

[8-Feb-15

A. Resource Segmentation: An Overview
Resource segmentation, as used in this essay, refers to the natural or
artificial division of natural resources, goods, or services into units that can
be appropriated from, or contributed to, a resource system. Segmentation
sometimes appears naturally but often is artificially constructed. For
example, land does not naturally occur in discrete segments but it can be
surveyed and demarcated into parcels for claiming. Similarly, where there
is no well-defined resource unit, standardized or shared harvesting
equipment (serving spoons, fishing nets, and so on) can produce one. Where
it is not possible to break off well-defined physical quantities, an
appropriation method may nonetheless place a practical limit on the amount
of a resource that can be appropriated over a particular timespan. This
creates a kind of temporal segmentation that may be measured in seasons,
days, or hours.12
It is helpful to consider how resource segmentation connects to Elinor
Ostrom’s distinction between resource systems and resource units—that is,
between stocks and flows.13 Common-pool resources, in Ostrom’s schema,
represent resource systems or stocks that produce flows of resource units
that individual actors can appropriate.14 In the standard pasture fable,15 the
resource system (stock) is the grazing pasture as a whole and the resource
units (flow) are the blades of grass that support the grazing cattle. Resource
systems also require inputs, such as seeds and labor in the pasture context.
What we often have, then, is a resource system marked by difficult
exclusion into which commoners feed rival, privately owned inputs, and out
of which they withdraw rival outputs, reducing them to private ownership.16
Resource segmentation relates both to the draws private actors make upon
the resource system, and to the contributions that they make to it.
With respect to draws from the system, it is natural to focus on the
resource units themselves, such as individual fish, fruits, or trees. But
access to resource systems may also be segmented in a variety of ways,
generating claims over a subset of the flow that will be produced. For
example, commoners may be limited to particular harvesting methods or
technologies17—what Carol Rose calls “RIGHTWAY”18—or there may
12

See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 228 (2005).
OSTROM, supra note 3, at 30-33 (making this distinction and developing its implications).
14
Id at 30.
15
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
16
It is this abutment between individually and commonly owned elements that pulls incentives out of
alignment in ways that may (but need not necessarily) lead to tragedy. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz,
13

The Property Right Paradigm, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 16, 22–23 (1973); Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons,
Semicommons, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 35, 37–38 & n.16 (Kenneth Ayotte &
Henry E. Smith eds., 2011).
17
See, e.g., GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 91 (1989) (describing regulation of
shrimp harvesting in Texas, which includes a restriction that “[d]uring the fall adult white shrimp season, only one
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simply be standard equipment that is used by convention. Cattle grazing on
a pasture provides an interesting example. The actual resource units in
question (blades of grass) are too small, numerous, and difficult to observe
to serve the purposes of segmentation. The cattle themselves, by contrast,
represent a highly visible form of “harvesting equipment” with a (roughly)
known capacity.19 The resource system is thereby segmented de facto based
on the number of cattle placed on the pasture. Fishing nets and boats can
operate similarly, at least if they have relatively standardized capacities.20
Rotations based on time represent another way of slicing up access to the
resource units.21
Segmentation is as important for contributions to a resource system
(time, effort, money, and so on) as for draws upon it. Indeed, we can recast
contributions as forgone draws and vice versa. One of the most significant
ways in which one contributes to a resource system is by not overdrawing
it—keeping cattle off the pasture and the grass on the ground, or keeping
fishing boats out of the water and the fish in the sea.22 Conversely, by not
contributing labor, money, or other inputs to maintain and improve a
resource system, one is effectively withdrawing (or withholding) from the
system that which is rival and amenable to private ownership—no less so
than when resource units are appropriated.23
B. Better Segments, Cheaper Governance
To remain sustainable, a resource system must keep aggregate
contributions above, and aggregate draws below, certain critical thresholds.
net twenty-five feet in width can be pulled by any vessel”).
18
Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources,
1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 9 (building on an enumeration of strategies provided in Steven N.S. Cheung, The Structure of a
Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J. L. & ECON. 49, 64 (1970)).
19
See, e.g., Ivo Baur et al., Why Do Individuals Behave Differently in Commons Dilemmas? The Case of
Alpine Farmers Using Common Property Pastures in Grindelwald, Switzerland, 8 INT’L J. COMMONS 657, 659-62
(2014) (observing that “livestock provides the means to harvest from common property pastures,” and describing
a system used in Switzerland that measures a pasture’s “maximum sustainable yield” in terms of summered
“livestock units” based on animal species and age).
20
See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 3, at 174 (“The cost of monitoring an apportioning scheme based on an
easily observable factor—what technology a boat is using—is much lower than the cost for one based on the
quantity of fish harvested.”). New technologies capable of generating higher yields can, therefore, disrupt existing
commons arrangements. See TERRY L. ANDERSON & PETER J. HILL, THE NOT SO WILD, WILD WEST 24-27 (2004)
(observing that although technological change “usually lowers the cost of establishing property rights, it can also
make the institutional entrepreneur’s task harder if it increases access to resources”).
21
See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 12, at 228-33 & table 8.2 (providing a catalog of “choice rules” for
allocating common-pool resources, including allocations based on location, time slot, quantity, and resource
attributes).
22
See, e.g., SUGDEN, supra note 3, at 137 (describing a fishing ground vulnerable to overfishing as “a
public good whose quality is maintained by the restraint of individual fishermen”).
23
There may of course be normative reasons to favor one characterization or the other; the point is simply
that both characterizations are possible. Cf. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of ‘Just Compensation’ Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1196–97 (1967) (noting the
malleability of the line between causing harm and failing to provide benefits).
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In the absence of prices to modulate the relevant demand or supply, some
other coordinating mechanism must be used. This is where resource
segmentation comes in. Norms of not taking too much or contributing too
little are easier to follow, monitor, and enforce where activities or resources
are broken into units that readily define how much is too much or too
little.24 But units that are too large, too small, or too hard to observe will not
serve these beneficial purposes.25 Improving segmentation, then, can
improve the prospects for governance systems that rely on individual
decisionmaking—spontaneous order rather than centralized control.
Most notably, segmentation influences how easily actors can meter their
own resource appropriations and monitor those of others. The significance
of monitoring to the successful management of common-pool resources has
been well noted.26 The way resources are broken up intuitively matters to
monitoring by affecting the visibility of actors’ draws and contributions.27
Self-monitoring may be as important as the monitoring of others in some
contexts.28 For example, studies on the importance of feedback regarding
energy use have demonstrated how making people aware of their usage, and
how it compares to that of others, can influence their behavior.29 Similarly,
research suggests that larger portion sizes tend to increase consumption, as
does an inability to keep track of the amount one has consumed.30
Segmentation thus serves as a kind of “nudge” that can alter resource use.31
24
David Lewis gives an example in which ten friends routinely share a plate of twenty shrimp, with each
person willing to limit herself to two shrimp as long as the others do the same. DAVID LEWIS, CONVENTION 96
(1969). While Lewis does not focus on the discrete nature of the food units and their ready divisibility by the
number of sharers, these factors would clearly make the sharing equilibrium easier to maintain over the alternative
“state of nature” outcome. See id.
25
See infra Part I.C.
26
Elinor Ostrom identifies “monitoring” as one of the eight “[d]esign principles illustrated by long-enduring
[common-pool resource] institutions.” OSTROM, supra note 3, at 90 table 3.1; see id. at 94-100 (discussing
monitoring and sanctions); see also Kipling Williams, et al., Identifiability as a Deterrent to Social Loafing: Two
Cheering Experiments, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH., 303, 307 (1981) (finding, in an experiment involving
group cheering efforts, that making people believe their contributions were identifiable deterred “social loafing”).
27
See OSTROM, supra note 3, at 203-05 (noting the relevance of “physical attributes of the resource itself” to
ease of monitoring, and describing some factors that can increase or decrease the visibility of appropriation
actions, such as whether “appropriators all return to the same location at the end of their activities, so that the
quantity of resource units each has acquired is open for casual inspection”).
28
The significance of opportunities for self-evaluation in group settings has been studied experimentally.
See, e.g., Stephen G. Harkins & Kate Szymanski, Social Loafing and Self-Evaluation with an Objective Standard,
24 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 354. 361 (1988) (finding, in an experimental study, that facilitating selfevaluation against an objective standard was sufficient to encourage contributions to group efforts).
29
See, e.g., Ian Ayres et al., Evidence from Two Large Field Experiments that Peer Comparison Feedback
Can
Reduce
Residential
Energy
Usage
(2009)
NBER
Working
Paper
No.
15386,
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15386.pdf. Recent work in this area has explored additional dimensions relevant to
shared energy usage settings. See, e.g., Caroline Leygue et al., Energy Sharing and Energy Feedback: Affective
and Behavioral Reactions to Communal Energy Displays, 2 FRONTIERS IN ENERGY RESEARCH 1 (July 2014)
(exploring how information about individual usage within shared energy settings generates emotional responses
like guilt, anger, and fear); Tom Hargreaves et al., Keeping Energy Visible? Exploring How Householders
Interact with Feedback from Smart Energy Monitors in the Longer Term, 52 ENERGY POLICY 126, (2013)
(examining longer-term effects, including on intra-household dynamics, of energy monitoring devices).
30
See generally BRIAN WANSINK, MINDLESS EATING: WHY WE EAT MORE THAN WE THINK (2006).
31
See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008). Approaches that encourage selfawareness or facilitate self-monitoring may be viewed as a more autonomy-preserving form of intervention than
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The measurement facilitated by segmentation also helps to keep rough
accounts, which can sustain reciprocity among members of a relevant
community.32 One of the advantages of informal resource sharing is that it
requires less specification of rights and duties—what Yochai Benkler terms
“crispness.”33 Nonetheless, repeat play in a reasonably well-defined context
will be facilitated by a shared understanding of the relevant unit of
appropriation or exchange. An example or perhaps metaphor is the “give-apenny-take-a-penny” saucer that appears by many cash registers; by making
the unit explicit, the proprietor conveys that the saucer is not to be emptied
into one’s pocket nor filled with the contents of one’s coin jar.
Segmentation plays a central role in formal rationing systems. For
example, hunting and catch limits may be stated in terms of numbers of
animals, or controlled through hunting seasons and methods.34 Limits on
portability, storage, or alienability similarly partition resources based on
parties’ personal capacities to use or consume.35 But segmentation can
check resource use even in the absence of formal rationing. For instance, a
buffet’s practice of providing smaller plates and cups not only slows
consumption (some time and effort is required to reload or refill) but also
communicates norms about what is an appropriate amount to consume.36
Likewise, the lines demarcating parking spaces serve as focal points that
generally induce compliance by motorists,37 even in free lots where the risk
of enforcement is minimal. Appropriate segmentation can also prevent
underuse by making clear what one can legitimately claim without
encroaching on the interests of others. For example, people may sit closer
together on public benches that are divided by armrests than on undivided
benches.38
other manifestations of “libertarian paternalism.” See Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron,
99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245, 1257 & n.46 (2005) (making this point and citing studies on the effects of (literal)
mirrors on behavior).
32
Cf. ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 55-56 (discussing the “rough mental account” that a person in a close-knit
community can keep with respect to her interactions with other community members); id. at 225-29 (describing
the “Even-Up” strategy for cooperation and punishment of defection).
33
Benkler, supra note 7, at 315-17.
34
Such rationing methods can also form the basis for more formal property rights. See, e.g. ANDERSON &
HILL, supra note 20, at 209-11 (discussing “individual transferable quotas” used in ocean fisheries).
35
All-you-can-eat buffets are an intuitive example in which consumption capacity segments resource units,
with portability prohibitions effectively constraining the time dimension. See also Richard A. Epstein, Why
Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 979-82 (1985) (discussing role of alienability limits in a system of
riparian rights); Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1430-33 (2009) (examining
limits on alienability, use, and storage as rationing devices).
36
See WANSINK, supra note 30, at 244, 60-61; THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 31, at 44.
37
For a discussion of how focal points can solve coordination problems, see, for example, Richard H.
McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1658-63 (2000) (citing and discussing
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960)).
38
See, e.g., BILL MAIN & GAIL GREET HANNAH, SITE FURNISHINGS: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE
PLANNING, SELECTION, AND USE OF LANDSCAPE FURNITURE AND AMENITIES 98 (2009) (observing that armrests
“can increase seating density, as people typically will sit closer together if their personal space is delimited by an
armrest”). Of course, armrests may instead (or additionally) be motivated by concerns about overappropriation
(or by a desire to filter users) given that they also keep people from lying down. See id.
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Pre-segmented contributions can also reduce the burdens of enforcing
norms about giving and reassure donors that they are contributing the
“right” amount. For example, someone taking up a collection for a gift
might indicate a round amount that everyone should contribute to make the
planned gift possible. Charitable organizations, which must solve much
larger-scale collective action problems, also commonly include suggested or
recommended contribution amounts rather than issuing open-ended pleas
for funds. Often the requested donation is conceptually concretized and
quantified by reference to a discrete and tangible unit of assistance, such as
a goat or a box of nails.39 Where truly indivisible goods are involved, it may
be enough to specify what the charity views as an acceptable and helpful
donation level. For example, campaigns by zoos to acquire elephants—true
lumpy goods—have solicited pennies from schoolchildren.40 The March of
Dimes campaign, started in 1938, was similarly able to elicit broad
participation for an indivisible cause (fighting polio) by focusing on a
contribution level that was broadly attainable.41 Research also suggests the
efficacy of establishing contribution tiers or categories in encouraging
people to “round up” their contributions to achieve the next level.42
In-kind contributions also depend on proper segmentation. Blood
donation, for example, features a standard donative increment—one pint.43
In other contexts, segment construction becomes important. As Benkler
observes, “peer production” labor “can be harnessed when a project is
broken up into discrete modules, whose granularity is varied and
sufficiently fine grained to allow individuals with diverse motivations to
engage in the effort at levels appropriate for their motivations but still
provide stable contributions to the whole.”44 Innumerable collective
projects, from quilting bees to barn raisings, depend on the ability to
39
See, e.g., Oxfam America, Unwrapped, https://www.oxfamamericaunwrapped.com/ (specifying the
monetary donations that would fund items such as a goat, a duck, soap, a vegetable garden, a medical kit, and
school supplies); Habitat for Humanity, https://www.habitat.org/cd/giving/one/donate.aspx?link=1 (providing a
“quick gift guide” that includes contributions ranging from “a box of nails” for $10 to “flooring” for $2000).
40
For example, Judy the Elephant was purchased by the Oklahoma City Zoo in 1949 through donations of
pennies, nickels, and dimes from 50,000 schoolchildren. See Judy Kuhlman, Children Reach in Pockets for
Oklahoma City Zoo Judy the Elephant Popular Campaign, NewsOK, April 24, 1994, available at
http://newsok.com/children-reach-in-pockets-for-oklahoma-city-zoo-judy-the-elephant-popularcampaign/article/2463998. Other animals have been acquired for other zoos through similar campaigns. Id.
41
The phrase “March of Dimes,” which played off the name of the popular newsreel “The March of Time”
was coined by entertainer Eddie Cantor, a supporter of what was then known as The National Institute for
Infantile Paralysis. See The March of Dimes, Eddie Cantor and the Origin of the March of Dimes,
http://www.marchofdimes.org/mission/eddie-cantor-and-the-origin-of-the-march-of-dimes.aspx. Cantor’s radio
appeal in January 1938 yielded $268,000 in dimes (mailed to President Roosevelt) within a few days.
42
James Andreoni & Ragan Petrie, Public Goods Experiments Without Confidentiality: A Glimpse Into
Fund-Raising, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1605, 1606, 1618-20 & fig. 3 (2004) (discussing this intuition and presenting
experimental results suggesting that reporting contributions in categories can “shift contributions to a higher
level”).
43
See, e.g., American Red Cross, Donation FAQs, http://www.redcrossblood.org/donating-blood/donationfaqs#DonationProcess. See also SUGDEN, supra note 3, at 4 (giving the example of Britain’s National Blood
Transfusion Service as a public good supported by voluntary donations).
44
Benkler, supra note 7, at 336.
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disaggregate and assign appropriately segmented tasks to be completed
before and during the interactive event. Making effective use of volunteers
requires similar slicing of time commitments into discrete and manageable
segments.45
C. When Segmentation Fails
If successful segmentation can lower governance costs and support
spontaneous order, poor segmentation can make coordination more costly
and unlikely. One way that segmentation can fail is when the demarcation
of appropriable units is unclear. This phenomenon can be seen even in the
context of private land holdings, where irregular shapes yield more
boundary disputes.46 But the point holds true for other interests as well. For
example, surface boundaries that sufficed for mining placer claims were
insufficient for subsurface quartz claims where it might become difficult to
tell whether the same or different vein was being tapped.47 Likewise
atmospheric elements like ozone are hard to manage because they are
“small (effectively invisible), highly mobile substances that are distributed
throughout the earth’s atmosphere.”48
Segmentation problems can also arise when the appropriable units are
very clear. Consider the example of college classrooms that are kept open
during nights and weekends to be used as study rooms. A study of a number
of college facilities undertaken decades ago found that “[t]he standard
custom seems to award the whole room to the first student to take
possession by squatter’s rights.”49 Here, too-large units induce people to
appropriate too much.50 But segmentation that leads people to take or accept
less than is really useful presents a problem as well. For example, Terry
Anderson and Peter Hill have suggested that the Homestead Acts
“specif[ied] a claim size that was generally inappropriate given the aridity
45
For example, the “One Brick” volunteer program that exists in several cities touts “commitment-free
volunteering” in which participants attend discrete volunteering events on an a la carte basis. See One Brick
Chicago, http://chicago.onebrick.org/.
46
See Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coordinating Property
Institutions, 119 J. POL. ECON. 426, 450–53 (2011).
47
See ANDERSON & HILL, supra note 20, at 117 (citing Gary D. Libecap, Economic Variables and The
Development of the Law: The Case of Western Mineral Rights, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 338, 345-46 (1978)).
48
Graham Epstein et al., Governing the Invisible Commons: Ozone Regulation and the Montreal Protocol, 8
INT’L J. COMMONS 337, 347 (2014).
49
STUART M. STOKE ET AL., STUDENT REACTIONS TO STUDY FACILITIES 15 (1960). See also id. at 9-10
(describing “library seminar rooms” that are effectively turned into “large private offices” (albeit ones whose
occupancy turns over frequently) because “the first student to study in one usually attempts to discourage others
from sharing it”); ROBERT SOMMER, PERSONAL SPACE 56 (1969) (emphasis in original) (citing and discussing the
Stoke et al. study).
50
Stoke et al. expresses pessimism about being able to turn these classrooms into successful study quarters,
but does note that experimentation “e.g. using folding partitions” might be tried. STOKE ET AL., supra note 49, at
15. Similar issues arise in the context of unsegmented natural resources. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, From H2O to
CO2: Lessons of Water Rights for Carbon Trading, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 91, 94 (2008) (observing that the western
water system had an implicit cap: “the entire stream”).
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of land on the frontier.”51 Similar issues exist on the contribution side as
well—asking too much or too little can backfire.52
Thus, segmentation can fail if it does not take a sufficiently visible
form, or if it does not align well with the efficient scale of appropriation or
use.53 It may also fail if it does not produce relatively homogeneous
appropriable or contributable units. Homogeneity need not be absolute;
there can be, for example, multiple tiers of contribution, and people may
appropriate different numbers of units based on their consumption needs.
But some degree of standardization is required for segmentation to serve the
metering and monitoring functions that reduce governance costs.54
***
The possibility that better segmentation can reduce governance burdens
provides a good reason for law and policy to pay attention to it. At some
level, of course, the idea of resource segmentation merely stands in for a set
of recognized factors that determine the success or failure of informal
resource arrangements: the clarity of entitlements,55 the importance of
monitoring and metering,56 the role of prominent relationships and focal
points,57 the use of marking and communication,58 and the significance of
reciprocity and notions of fairness.59 But even if these other concepts
collectively convey how and why resource segmentation lowers governance
burdens, segmentation’s congruence with these ideas suggests it is worth
51
ANDERSON & HILL, supra note 20, at 168-70. The Homestead Acts variously granted allotments of 160
acres, 320 acres, and 640 acres to those who met certain requirements, including living on and working the land
for five years. See id.
52
See, e.g., Andreoni & Petrie, supra note 42, at 1619 (suggesting that reporting charitable contributions by
categories or tiers “can be a powerful mechanism to affect contribution decisions” but observing that “[p]oorly
chosen categories may reduce contributions or may have no effect on shifting contributions at all”).
53
It is possible that the efficient scale for use would differ from the efficient scale for (at least some types of)
appropriation. The amount of land that can be successfully claimed and held through a first-in-time system like
that used in the Oklahoma Land Runs might, for example, differ from the amount that is necessary for successful
farming. For a discussion of some of the effects of costly racing during the 1893 Oklahoma Land Run, see
ANDERSON & HILL, supra note 20, at 172-74. The possibility of a difference between optimal segmentation for
appropriation and optimal segmentation for use speaks to the fact that the target resource (such as land) is never
the only resource in the picture. Instead, there is always a linked “resource-appropriation environment” that forms
a commons of its own. See Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 922-24
(2004).
54
Such standardization does sacrifice some of the advantages of customization. But it may allow informal
self-governance to succeed in place of top-down solutions that might be imposed by those who are less likely to
possess good information about the needs of each claimant or contributor. I thank Richard Epstein for discussions
on this point.
55
See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 81-82 (1985).
56
See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
57
See, e.g., SUGDEN, supra note 3 at 49-54; 98-107; McAdams, supra note 37, at 1658-63. Of particular
relevance to resource segmentation is the capacity of landmarks, whether natural or constructed, to provide focal
points. See RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW 86-90 (2015); Richard Brooks, Legal
Landmarks, IOWA L. REV. [this issue] (forthcoming 2015).
58
See, e.g., Rose, supra note 55, at 81-88.
59
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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paying attention to as a powerful and policy-malleable proxy.
An analogy to exclusion’s role in property rights might be drawn here.
Scholars recognize that exclusion is merely a means to an end—that of
enabling people to make use of resources.60 Exclusion proxies for an
alignment between inputs and outcomes that could be achieved through
other means, at least in theory, and it is that alignment that is really doing
the work. But exclusion captures our attention as an interesting and policyrelevant feature of property rights. Segmentation should as well.
II. CONSTRUCTING CHOICE SETS
The ability of resource segmentation to lower governance burdens is
only one facet of its importance for spontaneous order. Segmentation also
constructs the choice sets that appropriators and contributors face—the
menu of possible stopping points. The lumpiness of these choices can cause
private and social payoffs to converge on the same decision point, even
when externalities are present. On the other hand, sometimes lumpy choices
will force an even greater divergence between optimal behavior and
individual choices than would occur if all available decision points were
open. Understanding how choice sets can create such convergence or
divergence is important to the study of property rights because it helps
explain why externalities (including those that commoners inflict or bestow
on each other) may not spell the demise of a resource system.
A. Lumping Irrelevant Externalities
We can start with thumbnail sketches of two understudied concepts that
drive the analysis here: lumpiness and irrelevant externalities. Lumpiness in
a good, service, resource, or decision refers to the inability to produce or
make use of just any old amount; rather, the thing must be produced or
consumed (or sometimes both) in particular units.61 A bridge is the ultimate
lumpy good; if it is incomplete, it is of no use at all.62 In many other cases,
there are particular units or tiers that define feasible production and
consumption levels. Here, the choice menu of a party who is deciding how
much to contribute or withdraw does not comprise a continuous spectrum
but rather a limited set of discrete nodes along it.
60
See, e.g., J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 71 (1997) (observing that “exclusion is the
practical means by which that [use] interest is protected”); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property:
Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1747 (2007) (“The right to exclude from a
designated thing protects our interests in the use of things like cars or Blackacre; if no use could be made of a
given thing, there would be no reason to exclude.”).
61
See, e.g., Michael Taylor & Hugh Ward, Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy Goods: Alternative Models of
Public-Goods Provision, 30 Pol. Stud. 350, 353 (1982).
62
See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 59 (1982) (noting and qualifying this point).
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Irrelevant externalities are external effects that do not cause an actor to
behave differently than she would if she fully took those effects into
account.63 People frequently undertake acts that incidentally benefit others
even when they have no way of demanding payment from the beneficiaries.
Sometimes this is due to altruism, cooperative norms, or more formal
governance mechanisms, but in many cases the explanation is simpler: the
actor would do the same thing even if she fully internalized all the costs and
benefits. Consider, for example, a rose garden cultivator who makes her
garden as beautiful for her own purposes as she would if she could collect
viewing fees from her neighbors.64 Likewise, people may efficiently engage
in activities that harm others (like emitting pollutants) if they would still
make the same choice after taking into account the effects on others.65
The two ideas come together in the spontaneous order context in
following way: the lumpiness of choices can make it more likely that the
choice one selects for one’s own reasons will turn out to be the exact same
choice that is socially best.66 Where transaction costs preclude bargains to
fully internalize externalities, resource segmentation may be able to do
some of the work in encouraging socially valuable decisions. In other
cases, however, lumpiness can push private choices further away from the
social optimum. The following sections explain.
B. Fortuitous Lumps
Let us start with the optimistic account in which lumpy choices help
produce convergence between privately and socially optimal decisions.
Suppose an actor must decide whether to make a given chunky investment
that will have positive spillovers on others, such as attending a particular
event, buying a home on a particular block, or opening a store on a
particular corner. If this investment is a binary choice—attend the event or
63
James Buchanan and Craig Stubblebine define “Pareto-relevant externalities” as those that exhibit the
potential for “gains from trade.” James M. Buchanan & W. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 371,
374-77 (1962). Such potential gains exist only where the party affected by the externality would be willing to pay
the actor producing it enough to alter her behavior—that is, where internalization would make a difference. See id.
at 380 (making this point in the context of one party’s choice to build a fence that will affect another party).
Externalities are not Pareto-relevant if there is no such potential for gains from trade; because the affected party
could not pay the actor enough to change her behavior, internalizing the external cost would make no difference.
See id. at 374-77. I will refer to these simply as “irrelevant externalities” here to signify their irrelevance to
efficiency. Such externalities may, however, remain relevant to distribution. Cf. DUKEMINIER, ET AL., PROPERTY
49 (8th ed. 2014) (observing that if an actor does not change her behavior after taking an external effect into
account, the effect is no longer an “externality” but may still be distributively unfair).
64
See generally David Haddock, Irrelevant Externality Angst, 19 J. INTERDISC. ECON. 3 (2007).
65
See DUKEMINIER, ET AL., supra note 63, at 49.
66
This core intuition is explored in a slightly different context in Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in
Contract, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 997, 1013-19 (1992). Gergen gives the example of a real estate broker who, despite
reaping only a fraction of the benefits from a home’s sale, will nonetheless undertake the efficient lumpy choice
of putting a property on a multilist service as long as she internalizes a sufficient return from taking this step. Id.
at 1014 & n.55.
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not, say—then the actor need only internalize enough benefits to make her
participation privately worthwhile in order to go ahead with the entire
spillover-producing investment. If, on the other hand, her investments were
infinitely divisible, then we might expect underinvestment, given that she
does not get all the returns herself.67
A failure to appreciate the lumpiness of the choices that often confront
agents has led to an overestimation of how often externalities matter to
efficiency. Standard graphical depictions of externalities contribute to this
misconception by portraying choice sets as continuous, so that any
externality, positive or negative, will cause the privately selected stopping
point for a given resource draw or contribution to diverge from the socially
optimal stopping point.68
Figure 1 illustrates this point in the context of negative externalities.
Figure 1:
Externalities with Continuous Choice

67
Two important caveats to this assumption have been noted in the literature. First, if the actor has
preferences that are more intense than those of the others who will enjoy spillovers, she may readily provide the
good in question at a level that meets or surpasses the demand of all others. See David Haddock, Irrelevant
Externality Angst, 19 J. INTERDISC. ECON. 3 (2007). Second, it is immaterial that an individual cannot recapture
all of her own returns if she is in a setting where she is capturing comparably valuable positive spillovers from
others as a direct result of her own spillover-causing activity. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley,
Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 269 (2007). This might be the case where engaging in activities that cause
spillovers, like research and development, are a necessary predicate to benefiting from the research and
development of others. See id.
68
Likewise, formal models standardly assume continuity.
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The horizontal axis represents draws that an individual might make against
a common resource, as through pollution or harvesting, while the vertical
axis shows the impact in dollars. We would expect a rational actor to stop
making draws at QP, the point where her marginal private cost and marginal
private benefit lines cross; this is her private stopping point. The dotted
social cost line reflects the higher marginal social cost of the draws,
counting the impacts on others. The social stopping point, QS shows where
the actor should stop making draws if these costs were taken into account.69
Here, the negative externalities make the actor stop too late in making
draws. A similar graph could be shown in which positive externalities make
the actor stop too soon in making contributions that benefit others.
Lumpiness changes the story by limiting the menu of possible stopping
points, as shown in Figure 2.70
Figure 2:
Externalities with Lumpy Choices

It is now no longer possible for the actor to choose any point along the
horizontal axis as a stopping point; instead, there are only three possible
stopping points, as indicated by the vertical lines labeled 1, 2, and 3.
Imagine, for example, that these stopping points signify standard-sized
69
This graph assumes there are no positive externalities produced by the draws, so the marginal private
benefit is also the marginal social benefit.
70
For a different way of illustrating the effects of lumpiness on choices that involve externalities, see
Gergen, supra note 66, at 1014, Diagram 1.
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boatloads of fish or factory production runs that generate standard amounts
of pollution, and that it is not possible to stop harvesting or production at
intermediate points. The private actor cannot, therefore, stop at QP, the
“private stopping point” identified earlier; she must choose between
stopping a little sooner, at line 2, or stopping a lot later, at line 3. Given
those options, she will choose the former. This is easy to see by comparing
what she would lose relative to her ideal point if she went all the way to line
3 (the rightmost large dark gray triangle) with what she loses relative to her
ideal point by settling for line 2 (the rightmost small light gray triangle).
This is also the socially optimal choice. Her neighbors or fellow
commoners might be happier if she scaled all the way back to line 1, but
they could not pay her enough to do so; moving to line 1 produces a social
loss relative to settling for line 2. This is evident by comparing the social
cost relative to society’s ideal stopping point if she went all the way back to
line 1 (the leftmost large dark gray triangle) with the social cost relative to
society’s ideal stopping point for settling for line 2 (the leftmost small light
gray triangle). Thus, in this example, the lumpiness of the choice set
fortuitously causes our actor to behave a bit better (stop a bit sooner) than
she would if her choices were unconstrained.71 Of course, there are other
possible scenarios in which chunkiness proves less desirable, as the next
section explains.
C. Lumps as Cliffs
Where resource segmentation produces lumpy choices about
appropriation or provision, actors are deprived of the ability to select their
ideal stopping points. The section above showed that sometimes this will
push an actor in the direction of a more socially beneficial stopping point.
But the opposite may also be true. An example in a context where
spontaneous order is especially important—urban agglomeration—shows
both sides of this point.
Suppose an exciting technology store (call it Dapple) with a busy
downtown location must decide whether to open a second store in an
uptown location. Because there is a minimum efficient scale for the new
store, and no advantage to going beyond that scale, the choice is a binary
one—open the store, or not. If the private returns from the store justify the
choice, then it matters not at all that the Dapple placement will also create
positive spillovers for commercial and residential properties nearby; Dapple
will open the new store. If we further assume that opening a third store is
71
The statement in the text assumes that transaction costs would keep the parties from arriving at the
socially optimal position if choices were unconstrained. If transaction costs were zero, then chunkiness would not
provide the indicated advantage because the parties would reach the socially preferred position in any case. See
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1960).
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neither privately profitable nor socially beneficial, then Dapple’s private
choice about the number of stores will happen to converge with the socially
optimal choice. This need not always be the case: it is entirely possible that
taking all social benefits into account would call for more store openings
than private self-interest produces. But the chunkier the choices are relative
to the divergence between private and social payoffs, the more likely it is
that the private and social prescription will “land” on the same choice.
At the same time, the lumpiness of the choice raises the stakes and
increases the amount of inefficiency produced where the failure to
internalize externalities does make a difference. Thus, if the private returns
to a second Dapple store fall just a hair short of justifying the investment, an
entire socially efficient store is lost. Suppose instead that Dapple faces a
continuous choice about how large to make a single store. Here, it is more
likely that positive or negative externalities associated with a larger or
smaller footprint will be relevant to efficiency, since the menu of size
choices is continuous and unlimited. But at the same time, the consequences
are not as severe; rather than society losing an entire store as in the earlier
example, all that is lost is some marginal square footage.
As this example suggests, land use policies—such as the ease with
which an existing store can be expanded relative to the ease with which a
new store can be opened—can influence the shape of the choices that actors
make, and hence whether an urban actor is in a position to contribute to
urban agglomerations in big or small steps. The difference can affect the
sustainability of public goods and common-pool resources by altering the
degree to which private choices align with the social optimum.
III. INTERSECTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The discussion above has identified two channels through which
resource segmentation—the splitting up of contributable or appropriable
units—might influence the prospects for sustainable order in the absence of
formal entitlements. First, segmentation provides a metric that can facilitate
informal governance. Second, segmentation constructs choice sets, which
can affect how well private maximizing behavior aligns with the social
optimum. Subpart A briefly examines how these two channels of influence
interact. Subpart B considers how law and social policy might be made
more sensitive to segmentation considerations. Subpart C examines how
public investments and other policy choices can improve the odds that
parties will be willing to make lumpy, socially valuable choices.
A. Segmentation, Choice Alignment, and Governance
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The significance of resource segmentation for purposes of choice
alignment intersects with its significance for governance. Understanding
these interactions becomes especially important once we recognize the
capacity of law, policy, and even technology to influence how resources are
segmented. Consider again the limited menu of stopping points depicted in
Figure 2 above. This lumpiness in available choices might be due to a
technological constraint, or it might be socially or legally constructed. For
example, suppose that the draws against the commons involve fencebuilding—an act that benefits the fence-builder but cuts off the scenic views
of neighboring properties.72 Further suppose that as a result of law, norms,
or technology, fences must be constructed of prefabricated boards that come
in standard sizes, effectively limiting the height of the fence to just three
options: short (line 1), medium (line 2), and tall (line 3). For the reasons
discussed above, the actor will choose the medium fence, which is also the
socially preferred alternative on this limited menu.73
Suppose, however, that legal or technological changes permit
intermediate choices, including ones that perfectly align with society’s
preferred stopping point, QS, and with the fence-builder’s privately
preferred stopping point, QP. There is now the possibility of reaching a
Pareto-superior alternative through a bargain that would constrain the fence
to the socially optimal level.74 Of course, transaction costs may keep that
result from being realized.75 Meanwhile, the fence-builder is now free to
diverge further from the socially optimal result than she could under the
constrained choice set, by moving to her privately preferred stopping
point.76
Whether the expanded menu produced by finer-grained segmentation
makes things better or worse depends on how these effects interact. But it
also depends in part on other impacts that the segmentation choice may
have on the prospects for informal governance and cooperation.77 Recall
72
For a stylized fence-building example involving continuous height choices (but a nonlinear height
preference for the non-builder), see Buchanan & Stubblebine, supra note 63, at 377-80.
73
Supra Part II.B.
74
See Buchanan & Stubblebine, supra note 63, at 380. For this reason, we cannot rest easy simply because
the current menu of choices produces convergence between an actor’s privately optimal choice and the one that is
socially optimal; that convergence may be an artifact of a constraint in the system that keeps us from a Paretosuperior solution. See CLEM TISDELL, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 31 (1993) (“I]f in the economy,
externalities are infra-marginal or in other ways apparently Pareto irrelevant or even if they are absent altogether,
this is not evidence that production is conducted in an optimal way. A different choice of techniques may lead to
a greater overall output and in the new situation Pareto relevant externalities may exist.”).
75
See, e.g., Buchanan & Stubblebine, supra note 63, at 377; see generally Coase, supra note 71.
76
On the other hand, she might be forced to an even greater divergence from the social optimal by a limited
choice set, if it led her (on facts different from those shown in Figure 2) to build higher than even she herself
would prefer. See Part II.C, supra.
77
Similar analysis might be used to evaluate other limited menus, such as the numerus clausus principle in
property law. For a recent discussion of this principle as it relates to the emergence of new property forms, see
Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, The Numerus Clausus Principle, Property Customs, and the Emergence of
Buchanan & Stubblebine, supra note 63, at New Property Forms, IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming [this issue] 2015).
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again the role of segmentation in facilitating metering and monitoring—
including self-monitoring.78 If actors only have access to fairly largegrained, standardized moves in interacting with each other,
undercontributing or overdrawing becomes easier to observe. This can
constrain self-serving behavior and reinforce reciprocity, leading actors to
choose socially preferable options even when it is not strictly in their
private self-interest.
Consider how these points interact in common-pool resource contexts,
where there are no formal private property rights. These are the contexts in
which it might be least plausible that parties could bargain their way to full
internalization of externalities, since they lack well-defined property
interests to trade over.79 Restricting the choice menu through relatively
chunky alternatives may, therefore, not mean forgoing any realistic
opportunity to generate a finer-grained solution that would leave all actors
better off. The limited menu may also be more likely to edge actors toward
more socially desirable actions than they would select on their own where
those pro-social choices are reinforced through social norms and
reciprocity.80 Thus, in repeat-play contexts involving common-pool
resources, where informal governance considerations loom large and
reciprocity is important, the lack of fine calibration in choosing how much
to give or take may be a feature rather than a bug.
B. Sensitivity to Segmentation
The discussion in this paper suggests that scholars and policymakers
should attend more closely to resource segmentation, given its capacity to
bolster the prospects for informal order. As we have seen, the way in which
draws against and contributions to resource system are demarcated can have
significant effects on behavior—effects that should be studied and
harnessed.
Consider, for example, zoning ordinances like New York’s that state
seating requirements for privately owned public plazas in linear feet, while
giving limited attention to how this seating will be segmented.81 To be sure,
plazas over 10,000 square feet are required to provide moveable seating at a
rate of one chair per 200 square feet.82 The ordinance also encourages
78

See supra Part I.
See, e.g., Rose, supra note 55, at 81-82.
80
Instructive in this regard is the way that reporting charitable contributions by categories or tiers may
influence contribution levels. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
81
City of New York Zoning Resolution (Web Version), Art. III, ch. 7, §37-741 available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/pops/plaza_standards.shtml
82
Id. at §37-741(e)(4). The general quantity requirement is one linear foot per 30 square feet of plaza area.
Id. Thus, a plaza of 12,000 square feet would have to provide 400 linear feet of seating, 120 linear feet of which
take the form of individual chairs (60 chairs, credited at 24 inches each). There are a number of other requirements
about types and quantities of seating, although they place relatively few limits on how seating is to be divided up.
79
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provision of individual seating in plazas of all sizes by granting 24 inches of
credit for individual chairs, when their actual width averages only 19
inches.83 Although these tweaks tend in the right direction, the baseline idea
of specifying seating by the linear foot seems to embed a misunderstanding
about the way urban space is used. An alternative approach might set
performance standards84 such as requiring plazas to actually seat a certain
number of people during peak periods like lunchtime. This approach would
require plaza designers to think about what makes spaces inviting to people,
and how to break up space into chunks that people are comfortable
appropriating.
More broadly, efforts to support spontaneous order could be advanced
by making use of behavioral research investigating the impact of resource
configuration on decisions to cooperate or defect. For example, recent
experimental work has examined how a limited field of view for observing
the appropriations of others influences behavior,85 and how costly
communication among appropriators requires tradeoffs between
appropriating and communicating.86 Some limited work has considered the
significance of certain resource attributes, such as how clearly bounded and
mobile resources are.87 A focus on resource segmentation could extend
these lines of research by examining how the resource itself—if cut into
familiar, standardized units and harvested or collected in ways visible to
all—can serve as a form of communication.
C. Shifting Cliffs
The externalities generated by lumpy appropriation or contribution
decisions will often be irrelevant to efficiency, as Part II explained. As long
as an individual will make the same choice for her own reasons as she
would make under conditions of full internalization, it does not matter to
See generally id., §37-741.
83
Id. at §37-741(e)(4). An earlier version of the zoning code gave a larger amount of “credit” (30 inches)
for each such seat. See WILLIAM H. WHYTE, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF SMALL URBAN SPACES 36, 112-13 (1980)
(citing 1975 New York City zoning amendments).
84
Performance zoning, at least in its pure form, focuses on impacts rather than on specifying particular uses.
See DOUGLAS R. PORTER ET AL., FLEXIBLE ZONING: HOW IT WORKS 11 (1988); see also Jane Jacobs, DARK AGE
AHEAD, 153–57 (2004) (advocating a “performance code”); Frederick W. Acker, Note, Performance Zoning, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 363 (1991) (providing an overview of performance zoning). Although performance
standards are more commonly contemplated in the context of controlling negative externalities, they might be
applied to harness positive externalities as well. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Agglomerama, B.Y.U. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2015), Part III.B.4, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2532270.
85
See, e.g., M.A. Janssen, The Role of Information in Governing the Commons: Experimental Results,
18(4) ECOLOGY & SOCIETY 4 (2013); see also supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text (addressing the
significance of visibility to monitoring in a number of contexts).
86
See Marco Janssen et al., The Effect of Constrained Communication and Limited Information in
Governing a Common Resource, 8 INTERNAT’L J. COMMONS 617 (2014).
87
See, e.g., Epstein et al., supra note 48, at 347 (noting relative lack of work on resource attributes and citing
existing literature).
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efficiency that others are thereby harmed or benefited. This subpart focuses
on the “for her own reasons” part of this statement. Attending to it shows
how a focus on resource segmentation fits together with standard responses
to externalities.
Pigouvian taxes and subsidies are familiar mechanisms for attempting to
align self-interest with the public interest by charging or crediting an
individual for the external impacts of her choices.88 But other legal and
policy moves—from funding supportive infrastructure to leaving offsetting
spillovers untouched—can also make it worthwhile for an individual actor
to pursue the socially preferred course. Significantly, externalities do not
need to be fully internalized in order to produce socially optimal decisions;
rather, only those externalities that are relevant to efficiency must be
addressed in order to produce undistorted decisions. Stated more intuitively,
taxes, subsidies, and similar instruments need only push the individual actor
over the brink of doing the right thing or pull her back from the cliff of
doing the wrong thing (where “right” refers to the choice that she would
make if she were required to fully internalize all externalities).
Where lumpy choices are involved, very little may be required to give
the actor that necessary push or pull.89 Consider again an example
mentioned at the beginning of the paper: an individual must decide whether
or not to attend a festival, where doing so will visit positive benefits on
others and will also be socially valuable on net when the actor’s own
interests are taken into account. Suppose that once the actor is at the
festival, she will find it more pleasant to participate and throw off positive
externalities than to lurk sullenly in a corner. The trick, then, is to make it
worth her while to attend. She does not need to capture all the benefits that
she will generate in order for this to be the case; rather, she need only find
the proposition of attending to be a net positive. Minor subsidies in cash or
in kind—even if much lower than the externalized benefits she will
produce—can be enough to spur the lumpy attendance decision.
Investments in infrastructure that reduce her costs of getting to a festival,
for example, can push the balance sheet into positive terrain.90
There can also be instances in which refraining from charging back
88
Pigouvian taxes and subsidies are named after A.C. Pigou, who advocated using these instruments to
address gaps between private and social payoffs. See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, pt. 2, ch. 9, §§
13–17, at 192–203 (4th ed. 1932); see also Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics:
A Survey, 30 J. ECON. LIT. 675, 680-82 (1992) (describing Pigouvian taxes and subsidies).
89
Cf. Gergen, supra note 66, at 1015 (explaining that where tasks are lumpy in a principal-agent setting, “the
trick for the principal is to get the agent started so that the agent's self-interest will take over”); id. at 1015-16
(observing that legal rules can at times help provide this motivational push).
90
Cf. Rose, supra note 10, at 770 (discussing how public choices about roads and waterways encouraged
commerce); Gergen, supra note 66, at 1010-11, 1015 (explaining how the structuring of oil and gas leases induce
lessees to begin lumpy investments). Subsidies can take a variety of creative forms. See, e.g., Baur et al., supra
note 19, at 662, 669 (discussing the potential use of “marketing tools for alpine dairy products” to increase payoffs
from grazing animals in areas where undergrazing poses a risk).
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negative spillovers to an actor will facilitate that same actor’s provision of
positive externalities. For example, Keith Hylton has observed that certain
liability-constraining rules in tort law may help to encourage (or at least not
discourage) acts that, while creating some risk, also produce positive
externalities that the individual is not able to capture.91 Commentators have
similarly noted the positive externalities that were generated by “icemen”
who cleared roads in the Raleigh area following Hurricane Fran in 1996, the
better to access customers whom they could price-gouge.92 These accounts
suggest that the promise of supernormal profits induced these entrepreneurs
to undertake the (incidental) provision of a public good—cleared
roadways.93 Again, the lumpiness inherent in these situations diminishes the
amount of a push that is necessary to cause people to perform acts that have
positive spillovers.
Likewise, even small negative pressures may interact with resource
segmentation to control draws against the commons. The pricing structure
of some city bike sharing programs offers an interesting illustration.
Chicago’s Divvy system, for example, allows a patron who has purchased
either an annual membership or a 24-hour pass to borrow a bike for free—
but usage surcharges will accrue if she keeps the bike out for more than 30
minutes without returning to a Divvy station to check it out again.94 There is
no limit to how many 30-minute use segments one can rack up seriatim.95
But returning to a station repeatedly is a minor hassle, and it reinforces the
idea that the bikes are meant to be kept in circulation, not hogged by one
person for an extended period. Like a tiny serving spoon, the setup
communicates something about how much each patron is meant to take.
CONCLUSION
Resource segmentation matters. This paper has focused on two ways
that segmentation may prove important to the success of spontaneous order.
First, it can influence governance costs. Second, by constructing choice
91

Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1501, 1502, 1508-09

(2006).
92

See James McClure & Tyler Watts, The Greatest Externality Story (N)ever Told 20-21 (unpublished
manuscript, June 19, 2014) available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2462262; Michael Munger, They Clapped: Can
Price-Gouging Laws Prohibit Scarcity? Library of Economics and Liberty, Jan. 8, 2007,
http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2007/Mungergouging.html.
93
See McClure & Watts, supra note 92, at 21. According to an account relayed by Michael Munger, the
profit-making of the icemen was short-lived, as they were soon arrested for violating North Carolina’s price
control laws. See Munger, supra note 37 (citing the 1996 version of N.C. Gen. Stat. 75-36(a)).
94
Divvy Pricing, https://www.divvybikes.com/pricing; see also Boulder B-Cycle, Pricing Page,
https://boulder.bcycle.com/pricing.aspx (providing a similar pricing structure).
95
Divvy, How It Works, https://www.divvybikes.com/how-it-works (“Take as many trips as you want
during
your
Membership
or
Pass
period.”);
see
also
Boulder
B-Cycle
FAQs,
https://boulder.bcycle.com/About/FAQs.aspx (“Can I check out a bike immediately after returning a bike? Yes!
There is no wait period required between B-cycle returns and checkouts.”).
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sets, it can help align private decisions with those that are socially optimal.
As a first step toward fostering more robust and sustainable forms of
spontaneous order, law and policy should take account of the role of
resource segmentation as an important design element, and one that is often
amenable to social construction.
The analysis here holds significance beyond the context of explicit
public goods or common-pool resources. All systems of private property are
mixed systems—spillovers are ubiquitous, and private property derives
much of its value from the aggregate acts of contribution and appropriation
taking place in the neighborhood, district, metropolis, or region. How well
those mixed systems work depends on how well individual actors can
coordinate their innumerable independent actions. The ability to harness
and aggregate dispersed private information is the hallmark and core
advantage of any system of spontaneous order. Resource segmentation
represents a broad-spectrum technology for eliciting and transmitting
information, by constructing choices and rendering those choices visible.
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